Astana Summit in Tehran in crisis period (more specifically in Turkey-Russia relations) passed an important exam more than once. The summit, which was not on the agenda of the two countries but was compelled by the agenda, took place on 17 September in Sochi. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin announced their agreement to the whole world that they have agreed on the weapons-free zone in Idlib, while the Russian Ministry of Defense said: "There will be no operation in Idlib."
What do these two explanations mean? Let's say this is a declaration of a de facto ceasefire. Turkey has insisted in Tehran, which called, but indirect acceptance of the ceasefire offer as a kind of Russian-Iranian bilateral approach. Turkey seems to have convinced Russia over solution of the ongoing crisis in Syria's Idlib.
In this process of persuasion, Iran has been disabled. The fact that Iran is not included in the meeting in Sochi is an important detail that should not be missed. This allows us, in particular Syria, including the issue of "Extended Eurasia" two initiatives centered on regional issues with the countries of Turkey and the fact that once again shows Russia.
Well, a step in Tehran Iran stands close to Russia, Sochi I have to say once again why I have stayed in Turkey and has chosen him? Say ... Russia has seen that at least Turkey's joke in this process. Both Ankara's commitment to the field and diplomacy attacks have been effective here.
If you need to open some more; Turkey's border with his military buildup and the shipment carried out to the regions under the control field in all likelihood not afford it (and that includes war) clearly unraveled and its side as both President Erdogan as well as Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu of US involvement in the media their message in the field articles seems to leave no option for Russia.
So what if there was no consensus in Sochi? Let us say: 1) the Astana process collapsed; 2) Turkey-Russia-Iran triad member ceases to be a de facto alliance would be an adversary; 3) Turkey and Russia would come to the brink of conflict in the area. Such a conflict, not only limited to Turkey and Russia, it was situated in front against Syria, Iran and Turkey; 4) In parallel with these developments, Turkey quickly US / western flank and swung in the Turkish foreign policy stance put forward so far was dealt a severe blow in a serious sense; 5) The immediate vicinity of Russia (and of course Iran) would not be as safe as before; 6) Turkey-Russia-Iran triple fracture occurred in this context, not only in the foreign policy of these countries in their domestic politics and the economy would lead to radically change-transformation process.
Therefore, everything is one side; A regional war in Sochi has been prevented, as well as a number of operations aimed at the political map of the region. The process may seem like a liberated although Astana Sochi, the actual recovery "Eurasian axis" building process and in this context it is located in the center of Turkey-Russia cooperation.
All these crises tell us about Turkish-Russian relations: 1) Relations between the two countries do not have a structural framework. At the tactical level, it has a cyclical appearance; 2) There is an interest association between the parties that is being developed within the scope of common threat perceptions; 3) The problem of trust continues; 4) The Iranian factor should not be ignored by the US at least; 5) In spite of the fact that the parties are in need of each other in spite of everything, a co-operation is in the interest of the parties.
Turkey's importance for Russia emerges as: 1) Turkey, a sense of Russia's immediate environment policy "security insurance" is; 2) it can not be an effective actor in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East without Turkey (after the Sochi agreement of reduction of Russian aircraft carried out attacks against Syria and it can be considered as an important indicator.); 3) Balkans-Black Sea-Caucasus, the need for Russia to Turkey increased more than yesterday triangle; 4) There is a new agenda for Afghanistan over Central Asia. Moscow, Turkey must win at this point; 5) Ipekyolu has the potential to seriously threaten existing balances in the region as well as the opportunity. At this point, Russia's need for the Turkish-Islamic world will increase. The road also passes through Turkey; 6) Russia, the EU's confidence can be regained through Turkey; 7) problem with the US, NATO member Turkey is in the interest of Russia.
Thus, Russia, Turkey is aware of would be a big mistake to lose. Putin, therefore, refrained from making that fatal mistake in 1945 and did not want to be a second Stalin; In Sochi in Turkey and Iran also he has made a right choice point.